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Anticipatory Compliance Before Algorithms Issue Direct Organizational Commands

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Abstract

Organizations increasingly govern work through ratings, rankings, recommendations, allocation systems, monitoring tools, and predictive assessments. Yet control may begin before an algorithm issues an explicit instruction. Workers can infer what an opaque system values, imagine how traces will be judged, and alter conduct in advance. This Original Conceptual Theory Article develops a bounded explanation of that pre-command process. It integrates scholarship on algorithmic control, work design, labor-process power, electronic performance monitoring, behavioral visibility, opaque evaluation, surveillance, and worker agency. The article proposes three linked constructs: imagined evaluation, metric anxiety, and pre-algorithmic behavioral control. These constructs organize Recursive Compliance Theory, a proposed feedback model in which inferred expectations shape anticipatory self-discipline; self-discipline changes visible behavioral traces; and perceived algorithmic responses revise subsequent beliefs and conduct. The model also incorporates resistance, collective sensemaking, contestability, and human review as potential interrupting pathways. Its propositions are conditional rather than universal: opacity, evaluative stakes, dependence, legitimacy, task design, labor alternatives, and meaningful appeal should influence whether anticipatory adjustment emerges, intensifies, stabilizes, or reverses. The contribution is conceptual, not empirically validated. Existing evidence supports components of the argument but does not establish the integrated sequence, causal strength, prevalence, welfare effects, or organizational performance consequences. Testing requires temporally ordered, multilevel designs that distinguish inferred rules from actual system logic, employee experience from organizational outcomes, and technological capability from legitimate authority.

Keywords: Control before algorithmic intervention, Anticipatory compliance, Metric anxiety and imagined evaluation, Self-discipline under opaque algorithmic expectations, Theoretical propositions, Boundary conditions and organizational consequences

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Introduction

Algorithmic management is commonly described through visible interventions: a task is assigned, a warning appears, a recommendation is generated, a rating changes, or access is restricted. This framing begins too late. Platform research shows that workers may adjust their conduct toward what they believe an algorithm expects even when no contemporaneous human instruction has been issued. Related scholarship identifies algorithmic control through restricting, recommending, recording, rating, replacing, and rewarding, while work-design research shows that algorithms can alter autonomy, feedback, task allocation, and discretion through system architecture rather than direct orders [1-3]. The organizational problem, therefore, is not merely whether workers obey algorithmic commands. It is whether anticipated evaluation becomes behaviorally consequential before any command arrives.



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The distinction matters because allocative infrastructures can simultaneously function as control infrastructures. Matching criteria, reputation signals, and eligibility rules shape who receives opportunities and under what conditions, making apparently neutral allocation inseparable from the organization of worker choice [4]. In such settings, employees and contractors do not respond only to known rules. They may infer hidden thresholds, compare outcomes with peers, experiment with availability or pace, and treat silence as feedback. Control is consequently temporal as well as technological: organizational influence may be exercised through expectations about future algorithmic responses.

App-mediated work also distributes performance management across tracking systems, customer ratings, automated allocation, incentives, and sanctions, complicating conventional assumptions about who directs work and who bears responsibility for its consequences [5]. However, evidence from platform labor should not be treated as proof that the same dynamics occur identically in conventional employment. Formal employment protections, managerial accessibility, occupational norms, collective representation, and system transparency may alter both interpretation and response. The focal phenomenon is therefore best framed as conditional and sociotechnical rather than as an inevitable property of algorithms.

This article is an Original Conceptual Theory Article. Its objective is to explain how control may arise before algorithmic intervention by proposing a linked vocabulary and process theory. Anticipatory compliance denotes pre-emptive behavioral alignment with inferred algorithmic expectations. Imagined evaluation denotes a worker's provisional belief about the evaluator, criteria, or weighting applied to visible traces. Metric anxiety denotes proposed concern generated when quantitative indicators are consequential but their meaning remains uncertain. These concepts culminate in Recursive Compliance Theory, an original proposed synthesis rather than a validated causal model. The argument distinguishes formal policy from enacted practice, visibility from performance, autonomy from responsibility transfer, and technological capability from legitimate authority.

Theoretical foundations of anticipatory compliance

Anticipatory compliance requires a theory of organizing under incomplete knowledge. Learning algorithms can produce probabilistic and evolving outputs, disturbing assumptions that rules, expertise, and routines remain stable or fully inspectable [6]. Under these conditions, workers may face neither a clear command nor complete absence of control. Instead, they confront a moving interpretive environment in which prior outcomes, interface cues, customer reactions, and peer accounts become provisional evidence. The proposed construct therefore begins with perceived uncertainty about consequential evaluation, not with a claim that every algorithm is objectively opaque or intentionally coercive.

A labor-process perspective adds structural power. Platform organizations may present workers as autonomous market actors while retaining substantial influence over access, pricing, evaluation, and continued participation [7]. Anticipatory compliance is thus not reducible to personality, risk aversion, or cognitive error. It may arise because organizations control valued opportunities while withholding or continually changing the criteria governing them. At the same time, formal autonomy can remain meaningful. Workers may value flexibility, choose among tasks, or strategically manage multiple income sources. The theory must therefore distinguish experienced discretion from the transfer of commercial risk and responsibility.

Power asymmetry also does not erase agency. Qualitative evidence shows that workers can interpret, negotiate, circumvent, or strategically use platform arrangements even when information and access are distributed unevenly [8]. This matters theoretically because compliance is not the only plausible response to opaque expectations. Workers may resist, wait, share interpretations, manipulate visible signals, or exit. Anticipatory compliance should consequently be modeled as one possible response within a wider repertoire, conditioned by dependence, alternatives, identity, knowledge, and collective resources.

Finally, autonomy and algorithmic control can coexist rather than occupy opposite ends of a single continuum [9]. A worker may control schedule or location while remaining dependent on ratings, rankings, or allocation rules. This coexistence establishes a central boundary: observable flexibility does not demonstrate an absence of control, and intensive self-management does not prove internalized domination. The theoretical foundation is therefore relational and multilevel. Individual beliefs matter, but they are formed within task systems, labor markets, organizational designs, and institutional arrangements that shape both the stakes of evaluation and the feasibility of alternative action.

Metric anxiety and imagined evaluation

Electronic monitoring, managerial observation, and digital visibility can alter conduct because workers interpret what is seen and how incomplete behavioral traces may be evaluated [10-12]. These literatures establish three foundations. First, monitoring effects depend on purpose, intensity, transparency, privacy, and worker control. Second, observation can prompt concealment or adaptation as well as coordination. Third, digital traces make selected behaviors visible without making performance fully transparent. The present article synthesizes these foundations into imagined evaluation: a proposed representation of who or what will interpret a trace, which criterion will matter, and how much weight it will receive.

Imagined evaluation becomes especially important when evaluation is opaque. Longitudinal qualitative evidence shows that workers facing hidden or changing criteria construct provisional theories, test behavior, and revise those theories after ambiguous outcomes [13]. Such reactivity does not demonstrate that their beliefs accurately represent the algorithm. Nor does

it establish anxiety as the necessary mediator. It does show that uncertain evaluation can become an object of practical reasoning. Workers may treat delayed feedback, unexplained allocation, or rating movement as signals and then alter conduct before receiving an explicit instruction.

Metric anxiety is proposed here as concern arising when quantitative traces are salient, consequential, and interpretively uncertain. It is narrower than generalized anxiety and should not be equated with technostress, job insecurity, evaluation apprehension, or dissatisfaction with surveillance. A worker can dislike monitoring without fearing a particular metric; conversely, a worker may accept monitoring yet worry about an unknown threshold or weighting. Metric anxiety may focus attention on measurable conduct, narrow experimentation, encourage hidden work, or intensify efforts to manage visible indicators. These pathways remain propositions, not established effects.

The conceptual distinction also protects against assuming that visible data equal valid performance. Metrics may represent timeliness, acceptance, responsiveness, or customer reaction while omitting care, collaboration, recovery work, or contextual difficulty. Imagined evaluation concerns the worker's interpretation of how these traces will be used, whereas actual evaluation concerns the system's operational logic and organizational practice. Empirical testing must measure both. Without that separation, apparent support for the theory could simply reflect accurate knowledge of a transparent rule, ordinary goal pursuit, or fear of job loss rather than the proposed mechanism.

Self-discipline under opaque algorithmic expectations

Algorithmic surveillance can organize work without a visibly present observer by making movement, timing, availability, or task completion continuously legible within platform-defined space [14]. The proposed concept of self-discipline refers to worker-initiated regulation of pace, presentation, availability, task choice, or effort under perceived evaluative visibility. It does not imply free consent, complete internalization, or continuous obedience. The same action may represent strategic adaptation, temporary accommodation, identity protection, or an attempt to preserve access to work.

Control and resistance can also co-evolve across actors and stages rather than appearing as mutually exclusive outcomes [15]. A worker may comply with an inferred acceptance-rate expectation while simultaneously sharing avoidance strategies with peers, contesting a customer rating, or withholding effort elsewhere. This temporal coexistence is important because a static measure of compliance can obscure how workers alternate among accommodation, experimentation, resistance, and exit. Recursive Compliance Theory therefore treats self-discipline as revisable conduct within a feedback process, not as a settled psychological state.

Platform configuration further limits technological determinism. Comparative evidence shows that similar digital tools can produce different control intensities depending on scheduling, classification, rating, allocation, sanction, and market arrangements [16]. Self-discipline should thus be attributed to a sociotechnical configuration rather than to an algorithm in isolation. Organizational policies, customers, peers, labor alternatives, and interface design may all shape what workers believe is expected and what responses are feasible.

Table 1 organizes the evidence, constructs, relationships, uncertainties, and boundary conditions required for definitions, constructs, and conceptual boundaries for anticipatory compliance before algorithms issue direct organizational commands.

Table 1. Definitions, constructs, and conceptual boundaries for Anticipatory Compliance Before Algorithms Issue Direct Organizational Commands.

Construct or component	Definition	Problem addressed	Distinction from adjacent concepts	Proposed role	Uncertainty	Boundary statement
Algorithmic expectation	Provisional belief about what a system rewards, penalizes, or notices.	Explains action under incomplete rules.	Not actual code or formal policy.	Proposed antecedent representation.	Beliefs may be inaccurate or socially shared.	Measure separately from system logic.
Imagined evaluation	Inferred evaluator, criterion, weighting, or audience attached to visible traces.	Explains consequential meaning before feedback.	Not confirmed monitoring or known supervision.	Proposed interpretive mechanism.	Audience may be human, algorithmic, customer, or composite.	Visibility does not establish valid evaluation.
Metric anxiety	Proposed concern when quantitative traces are consequential but interpretively uncertain.	Differentiates metric-focused concern from general strain.	Not technostress, insecurity, or generalized anxiety.	Proposed mediator for some responses.	No validated measure or causal estimate.	Requires discriminant and predictive validation.
Anticipatory compliance	Pre-emptive alignment with inferred expectations before an explicit command.	Identifies pre-command behavioral adjustment.	Not post-command obedience, habit, or accidental alignment.	Core proposed response.	Alignment may reflect incentives, selection, or coordination.	Establish intent and temporal ordering.
Self-discipline	Self-initiated regulation of pace, availability,	Explains control without co-present supervision.	Not autonomy, intrinsic	Proposed enactment pathway.	May coexist with resistance or valued flexibility.	Behavioral intensity does not

	presentation, task choice, or effort.		motivation, or consent.			prove internalization.
Pre- algorithmic behavioral control	Conduct shaped before direct system instruction through anticipated allocation, rating, sanction, or reward.	Specifies the focal temporal domain.	Not control following an explicit notification.	Proposed temporal category.	Policy, customers, peers, or markets may drive conduct.	Requires event- timed evidence and rival tests.
Recursive compliance	Proposed loop linking inferred expectations, conduct, traces, perceived response, and updated beliefs.	Integrates the article's domains.	Not repeated obedience or a one-way effect.	Principal original theory contribution.	The loop may weaken, reverse, or stabilize.	No causal arrow or outcome is validated.

Note: Evidence-derived statements are bounded by the cited sources. "Proposed" identifies original conceptual synthesis requiring empirical testing.

Pre-algorithmic behavioral control

Pre-algorithmic behavioral control denotes conduct shaped before a system delivers an explicit instruction, warning, allocation, or sanction. Its defining property is temporal, not technological: workers act on anticipated consequences rather than on a received command. Such action may include remaining continuously available, declining unfamiliar tasks, accelerating work, presenting oneself strategically, or conserving effort. It may also involve collective counter-practices. Comparative research on couriers shows that dispersed workers can create solidarity despite individualized platform management, converting private uncertainty into shared interpretations and coordinated claims [17]. Collective sensemaking may therefore weaken, redirect, or politicize anticipatory adjustment rather than simply reinforcing it.

Individual agency can also remain concealed. Workers facing platform control have used hidden resistance, resilience, and practical reworking instead of responding through compliance alone [18]. These practices complicate any inference drawn from apparently aligned behavior. A worker who follows a suspected rule may be preserving access while disputing its legitimacy, gathering information, or preparing an alternative. Conversely, apparent noncompliance may reflect misunderstanding, technical failure, caregiving constraints, or an effort to protect service quality. The proposed category therefore includes compliance and counter-compliance as possible pre-command responses, but it does not classify every unexplained deviation as resistance.

Strategic ambiguity further separates the focal process from technological determinism. Firms and workers may exploit the boundary between autonomy and control, shifting responsibility, risk, and discretion through classification and informational asymmetry [19]. Anticipatory conduct can thus result from organizational narratives, contractual arrangements, customer expectations, or labor-market scarcity as well as algorithmic opacity. A valid test must identify what workers believe will happen, when that belief forms, whether an explicit command has already occurred, and which actor or system is perceived to control the consequence. Behavioral traces alone cannot establish these elements.

The unit of analysis also matters. A worker's anticipation is an individual-level interpretation, but the conditions producing it may reside in team routines, organizational policy, customer participation, or labor-market structure. Shared behavioral adjustment does not by itself establish an organizational norm, and a formal transparency policy does not establish that workers can predict enacted evaluation. Researchers should therefore distinguish individual beliefs, socially circulated folk theories, local supervisory practice, and actual system configuration. Convergence across workers may indicate common exposure, peer influence, or common error; divergence may indicate differential access, task variation, or unequal consequences.

Pre-algorithmic behavioral control is consequently proposed as a temporal analytic category rather than a new form of authority. It identifies a window in which imagined evaluation may become consequential while preserving rival explanations and worker agency. The category should be rejected or narrowed where workers possess stable knowledge of transparent rules, where conduct precedes no anticipated consequence, or where observed behavior is better explained by ordinary professional standards. Its value lies in directing attention to control's onset: before organizations interpret adaptation as commitment, autonomy, or performance, they must consider whether workers are acting under uncertain expectations they have learned to anticipate.

Proposed recursive compliance theory

Algorithmic management may enable coordination, consistency, or access while also constraining autonomy and redistributing value, making its consequences dual rather than uniformly harmful [20]. Recursive Compliance Theory is proposed to explain one conditional process within this broader duality. The theory begins when workers perceive evaluative stakes, incomplete criteria, and dependence on a sociotechnical arrangement. They form an imagined evaluation, appraise the possible consequences of visible traces, and may experience metric anxiety. Some then engage in anticipatory self-discipline before a direct command. These links are propositions informed by adjacent evidence, not an empirically demonstrated chain. Task, performance, and reward controls provide possible inputs to the loop because workers experience allocation, monitoring, ratings, and incentives as interconnected features of algorithmic human resource management [21]. Anticipatory

adjustments can change the traces subsequently available to a platform, customer, manager, or model. A perceived response—such as improved allocation, silence, or an unexplained rating change—may then update the worker's provisional theory. Because the actual rule may remain unknown, even random variation can be interpreted as confirmation. The loop can intensify, stabilize, weaken, or reverse.

Figure 1 presents the original conceptual synthesis for recursive compliance theory, showing how the article's principal constructs, mechanisms, uncertainties, and decision boundaries are connected.




Figure 1. Recursive Compliance Theory

Perceived legitimacy should condition the loop because acceptance of algorithmic control varies with workers' judgments about its appropriateness [22]. Legitimacy is not identical to compliance, however. Workers may comply because alternatives are scarce, sanctions are feared, or the system is difficult to contest. Likewise, favorable outcomes may retrospectively increase legitimacy judgments. The theory therefore treats legitimacy as a moderator whose temporal direction requires testing, while separating technological capability from rightful authority and formal permission to speak from consequential influence over a decision.

Platforms also redistribute control among organizations, customers, workers, and institutions, making the algorithm an inadequate standalone unit of analysis [23]. Recursive compliance should therefore be attributed to a sociotechnical arrangement. Customers may generate ratings, managers may select thresholds, designers may configure defaults, and regulators or collective agreements may limit use. These actors can reinforce or interrupt the loop. Organizational consequences are similarly conditional: anticipatory adjustment could narrow discretion and create hidden work, but transparent and contestable systems could support legitimate coordination.

Table 2 organizes the evidence, constructs, relationships, uncertainties, and boundary conditions required for proposed mechanisms, relationships, and organizational consequences in anticipatory compliance before algorithms issue direct organizational commands.

Table 2. Proposed mechanisms, relationships, and organizational consequences in Anticipatory Compliance Before Algorithms Issue Direct Organizational Commands.

Mechanism or relationship	Antecedent	Mediator or process	Moderator	Expected consequence	Rival explanation	Validation requirement
Opacity to imagined evaluation	Unclear criteria or feedback	Provisional rule inference	Transparency; peer knowledge	Adjustment or experimentation	General uncertainty	Show belief formation before behavior.
Metric salience to metric anxiety	Consequential visible traces	Attention to uncertain indicators	Stakes; alternatives; latency	Metric optimization or strain	Insecurity or technostress	Establish discriminant validity.

Adjustment to changed trace	Pace, availability, or task-choice changes	New data enter evaluation	Adaptability; configuration	Reinforcement or stabilization	Selection or policy change	Test trace mediation temporally.
Ambiguous response to renewed inference	Delayed or unexplained outcome	Folk-theory updating	Explanation; audit access	Oscillation or escalation	Random variation	Compare beliefs with actual changes.
Legitimacy to acceptance	Perceived appropriateness	Reduced contestation	Fairness; human review	Acceptance or lower resistance	Dependence or fear	Separate legitimacy from constraint.
Collective sensemaking to counter-recursion	Shared experience and networks	Coordinated voice or resistance	Institutional support	Interruption or transferred control	Conformity or misinformation	Demonstrate change in the loop.
Contestable design to coordination	Clear criteria and meaningful appeal	Calibrated adaptation	Work design; interdependence	Consistency without excessive control	Stronger supervision	Test beneficial, null, and adverse effects.

Note: Relationships and consequences are proposed unless the supporting-evidence cell identifies an established component. No row states a validated causal pathway.

Theoretical propositions

Experimental evidence indicates that fairness, trust, and emotional responses to algorithmic decisions vary with task characteristics and whether a human or algorithm acts as decision-maker [24]. Accordingly, opacity alone should not predict anticipatory compliance uniformly. Proposed Proposition 1 states that perceived opacity will be more strongly associated with imagined evaluation when outcomes are consequential, feedback is delayed, and workers lack credible alternative explanations. Proposed Proposition 2 states that imagined evaluation will be more strongly associated with metric anxiety when visible indicators are salient but their relationship to valued outcomes remains uncertain. Both propositions require direct measures of beliefs, not proxies inferred solely from system use.

Limited opportunities to modify an imperfect algorithm can increase willingness to use it, suggesting that even modest agency may alter algorithmic response [25]. Proposed Proposition 3 therefore states that meaningful contestability will weaken the relationship between metric anxiety and anticipatory self-discipline. Contestability must be substantive: an appeal channel that cannot change an outcome may create procedural visibility without consequential influence. The relevant moderator is not the presence of a button or policy but workers' informed ability to question evidence, obtain explanation, correct data, and secure human reconsideration without disproportionate retaliation or cost.

Algorithm appreciation provides an equally important rival to algorithm aversion because people sometimes weight algorithmic advice more heavily than human advice [26]. Proposed Proposition 4 states that perceived objectivity, consistency, or usefulness may increase voluntary alignment, particularly for tasks viewed as analytically tractable. Such alignment should not automatically be classified as anxious compliance. Proposed Proposition 5 consequently distinguishes reliance based on understood and endorsed coordination from reliance driven by uncertain, high-stakes evaluation. Empirical tests must examine perceived legitimacy, comprehension, dependence, and benefit rather than treating behavioral conformity as evidence of one motive.

Proposed Proposition 6 states that changed behavioral traces will reinforce subsequent anticipatory compliance only when workers attribute later outcomes to those changes. Proposed Proposition 7 states that collective sensemaking can either strengthen the loop by stabilizing shared folk theories or weaken it by enabling resistance and alternative explanations. Proposed Proposition 8 states that the loop will be less persistent when rules are stable, explanations are credible, labor alternatives are available, and adverse decisions are meaningfully reviewable. These propositions are falsifiable: null associations, reverse ordering, accurate transparent expectations, beneficial voluntary adaptation, and resistance without prior compliance would all require revision of the theory.

Boundary conditions and organizational consequences

Job insecurity offers a major alternative explanation. Threats to employment continuity can generate strain, job-preservation motivation, social-exchange reactions, and proactive coping without requiring imagined algorithmic evaluation [27]. Metric anxiety must therefore demonstrate discriminant and incremental validity beyond insecurity, technostress, general uncertainty, and economic dependence. Selection is another threat: workers most willing to tolerate metricized environments may remain, while others exit. Cross-sectional evidence could then mistake workforce composition for a control effect. Temporal research should measure prior dispositions, employment alternatives, and changes in actual system design.

Governance conditions also set a decision boundary. Artificial intelligence in human resource management raises challenges involving data quality, organizational complexity, fairness, and accountability [28]. A system's capacity to rank, predict, or recommend does not confer legitimate authority to determine access, discipline, or reward. Organizations should not treat Recursive Compliance Theory as a deployment checklist. Its governance implication is diagnostic: decision-makers should

examine whether workers know what data are used, can correct errors, understand consequential criteria, and have access to accountable human review. Whether such arrangements improve outcomes remains an empirical question.

Work design supplies the broadest boundary because digital technologies interact with task, social, organizational, and institutional conditions [29]. Individual experiences cannot be generalized automatically to team coordination, service quality, innovation, or organizational performance. Anticipatory adjustment may reduce experimentation in one setting while supporting reliable coordination in another. Visibility may expose performance-relevant behavior or merely what is easiest to count. Responsibility may be genuinely delegated or transferred without resources. Research must therefore specify the level of analysis, occupation, technology, time horizon, and valued outcome before assessing consequences.

Organizational consequence claims also require a counterfactual. A decline in experimentation after system introduction could reflect learning, task stabilization, staffing changes, or customer demand rather than anticipatory compliance. Likewise, improved consistency may mask unrecorded effort or exclusion. Appropriate designs should compare plausible alternative mechanisms, include outcomes valued by different stakeholders, and examine distribution over time. A single favorable aggregate indicator cannot establish that control is legitimate, sustainable, or equitably experienced.

Potential consequences include narrowed discretion, concealed recovery work, strategic metric optimization, stress, reduced learning, and weakened voice. Alternative consequences include clearer priorities, consistency, faster coordination, and protection against arbitrary human judgment. The theory predicts none unconditionally. Decision readiness requires evidence that the proposed constructs are measurable, temporally ordered, distinct from rivals, and linked to outcomes without unacceptable distributional costs. It also requires attention to who benefits, who bears errors, and whether affected workers possess substantive influence. Until such evidence exists, the theory should guide questions and research designs rather than prescriptions.

Conclusion

This Original Conceptual Theory Article advances a temporal reframing of algorithmic control. Organizational influence may begin not with an explicit instruction but when workers infer consequential expectations, imagine how visible traces will be evaluated, and regulate conduct in advance. The proposed constructs of imagined evaluation, metric anxiety, and pre-algorithmic behavioral control connect structural power, opacity, monitoring, work design, and worker agency within Recursive Compliance Theory.

The contribution is deliberately bounded. Existing scholarship supports the component phenomena, including opaque evaluation, visibility, surveillance, strategic adaptation, legitimacy judgments, resistance, and configuration-dependent control. It does not validate the integrated loop, establish its prevalence, determine causal strength, or demonstrate beneficial or harmful organizational outcomes. Compliance may coexist with resistance, valued flexibility, professional standards, insecurity, or algorithm appreciation. Technological capability does not establish legitimate authority, and behavioral visibility does not equal performance.

The theory is therefore a testable conceptual proposal rather than an implementation-ready prescription. Its value depends on research that observes temporal ordering, compares worker beliefs with actual system logic, admits null and reverse pathways, and separates individual experience from multilevel consequences. Such evidence could refine, limit, or reject the theory. Until then, Recursive Compliance Theory identifies a neglected organizational question: what forms of control are already operating before an algorithm appears to command?

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