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How Performance Dashboards Narrow Attention and Organizational Behavior

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Abstract

Performance dashboards are often treated as neutral devices for summarizing organizational information, yet their visibility, comparability, update frequency, and links to evaluation may also shape what employees notice, discuss, and prioritize. This Original Propositional Model Article develops a non-empirical account of dashboards as behavioral environments rather than passive reporting interfaces. It integrates scholarship on electronic performance monitoring, algorithmic control, transparency, performance visualization, social comparison, relative performance information, attention, gaming, and enabling control. The principal contribution is the proposed Dashboard-Driven Behavior Model, which links dashboard configuration to interpretive comparison processes, proposed metric anxiety, proposed metric salience concentration, self-presentational adaptation, and performance narrowing; the model treats narrowing as conditional rather than inevitable because metric quality, breadth, feedback design, developmental framing, trust, and enabling forms of control may attenuate, redirect, or reverse the proposed pathways. The article distinguishes visible performance from underlying performance, individual reactions from team- or organizational-level consequences, and conceptual plausibility from empirical validation, implying that dashboard design should be evaluated not only by informational efficiency but also by the attentional and social environment it creates; testing the model requires longitudinal, experimental, multilevel, and construct-validation research capable of comparing the proposed mechanisms with rival explanations such as goal clarity, learning, incentives, leadership, and task structure.

Keywords: Dashboards as behavioral environments, Social comparison through visible metrics, Metric anxiety and self-presentation, Performance narrowing, Organizational design safeguards, Performance

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Introduction

Performance dashboards compress heterogeneous organizational activity into visible indicators that can be monitored, compared, and acted upon. That informational function is valuable, but it is incomplete as a behavioral account. Electronic performance monitoring research shows that digital systems can make work-related behavior more observable and evaluable, thereby changing the conditions under which employees experience performance information [1]. Algorithmic-control scholarship similarly demonstrates that digital systems may participate in direction, evaluation, and discipline rather than simply presenting neutral facts [2]. For an organizational-behavior analysis, the central question is therefore not only whether a dashboard reports performance accurately, but also what forms of attention, comparison, interpretation, and adaptation become more likely when particular indicators are continuously made salient.



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A second limitation of a purely informational view is that visibility itself changes the social setting in which performance is interpreted. Transparency research shows that observation can alter behavior and control conditions, so greater visibility cannot automatically be equated with uncomplicated informational improvement [3]. Performance-measurement visualizations also simplify complex activity into particular calculative representations, making some relationships cognitively accessible while leaving others less prominent [4]. Such simplification may be useful for coordination and decision speed, yet it creates a theoretical opening for selective attention: what is rendered visible may become easier to notice, discuss, defend, and optimize than what remains peripheral. This possibility does not establish harmful narrowing, but it makes dashboard design behaviorally consequential in ways that accuracy alone does not capture.

Tracking technologies further illustrate that measurement arrangements can reconfigure accountability by changing which actions and outcomes become recordable, reviewable, and attributable [5]. Still, deterministic accounts are inappropriate because performance measurement can operate in enabling as well as constraining forms [6]. Employees may use measures to learn, coordinate, identify problems, or exercise informed discretion, particularly when the system supplies broad, credible information and supports problem solving rather than punishment. Accordingly, this article does not assume that dashboards inherently diminish autonomy or redirect effort toward dysfunctional targets. It asks instead under what conditions visible measurement becomes sufficiently salient and consequential to reorganize attention, interpersonal comparison, and behavioral allocation.

The article develops an Original Propositional Model rather than an empirical test or validated intervention. Its central contribution is the proposed Dashboard-Driven Behavior Model, which connects dashboard configuration with comparison activation, perceived evaluation, proposed metric anxiety, proposed metric salience concentration, self-presentational adaptation, and performance narrowing. The model treats these relationships as conditional, allows null or beneficial pathways, and separates individual experience from team- and organization-level inference. The analysis first examines social comparison through visible metrics, then develops metric anxiety and self-presentation as proposed mechanisms, and subsequently defines performance narrowing as a proposed allocation pattern. Later sections integrate these domains into the model, derive testable propositions, and specify organizational design safeguards as hypotheses rather than universal prescriptions.

Social comparison through visible metrics

Social comparison provides the first bridge between dashboard visibility and behavior. Organizational scholarship shows that employees routinely compare themselves with others to interpret standing, competence, fairness, and progress [7]. Dashboards may intensify the accessibility of such comparisons when they place individual, team, or unit indicators side by side, rank them, or repeatedly signal distance from peers or targets. The proposed mechanism is not that visibility automatically causes comparison, because employees may ignore, contest, or reinterpret displayed information. Rather, visible metrics are treated as comparison affordances: they can make certain referents easier to select and certain differences harder to disregard, particularly when the metrics are consequential or socially meaningful.

Relative performance information research reinforces this interpretive view. Managers do not respond mechanically to comparative metrics; they evaluate who constitutes a meaningful comparison target and whether observed performance gaps appear attainable or diagnostic [8]. Recognition systems provide a related caution because greater public visibility can sometimes produce reactions inconsistent with the assumption that recognition necessarily makes employees feel more valued [9]. These findings imply that the behavioral significance of a dashboard depends not only on whether comparison information exists, but also on how employees interpret the relevance, legitimacy, and social meaning of the comparison. Informational visibility and psychological salience should therefore remain analytically distinct.

Evidence from performance awards further shows that visible relative recognition can spill over into collaboration among organizational members [10]. More directly, experimental evidence on peer-recognition leaderboards indicates that the basis of ranking matters: ranking employees according to recognition received versus recognition given can generate different patterns of proactive helping [11]. This distinction is central to the proposed model because it rejects a generic “leaderboards motivate” or “leaderboards harm” proposition. Metric architecture determines what status is made legible. A dashboard emphasizing individually received outcomes may activate different motives from one emphasizing contribution, assistance, or collective accomplishment, even when both are equally visible.

The article therefore defines social comparison through visible metrics as the process by which displayed performance information makes relative standing available for interpretation and potentially consequential for behavior. The construct is narrower than transparency, because information may be visible without becoming a salient comparison cue, and broader than rank, because employees may compare trajectories, gaps, categories, or qualitative signals. Alternative explanations include goal clarity, learning, incentive effects, and pre-existing competition; these mechanisms may operate alongside or instead of comparison. Across field, experimental, and quasi-experimental evidence, visible comparative signals can reorganize affect and interpersonal behavior without establishing a uniform performance effect [8–10].

Metric anxiety and self-presentation

The next step concerns how consequential visibility may be experienced. Meta-analytic evidence on electronic performance monitoring does not support a simple assumption that more monitoring reliably improves worker performance, and it documents heterogeneous relationships with employee outcomes [12]. This heterogeneity matters because dashboards can combine information, surveillance, evaluation, and feedback in different proportions. The proposed construct of **metric anxiety** refers specifically to anticipatory evaluative strain associated with visible, consequential performance indicators. It is not presented as an already validated scale or universal response; instead, it organizes a plausible family of reactions that may arise when employees believe that displayed metrics will shape judgments about competence, rewards, reputation, or continued standing.

Relational mechanisms provide one pathway through which such strain may develop. Electronic monitoring can erode leader-member social exchange and thereby contribute to counterproductive consequences, suggesting that employees interpret measurement partly through the quality of the surrounding managerial relationship [13]. In dashboard settings, this means identical indicators may be experienced differently when a supervisor is trusted, when workers can explain anomalies, or when metrics are treated as developmental evidence rather than unilateral proof. Metric anxiety is therefore proposed as relationally conditioned, not technologically determined. Low trust, ambiguous metric validity, punitive consequences, or limited opportunity to contextualize performance should increase its plausibility, whereas supportive interpretation and credible measures may reduce it.

Monitoring may also change attention itself. Experimental evidence shows that electronic monitoring can alter sustained attention under controlled conditions, although laboratory effects should not be transferred directly to complex organizational work [14]. Building on this evidence, the article proposes metric salience concentration as a distinct mechanism: the disproportionate cognitive prominence of visible or consequential measures relative to less observable aspects of work. Metric salience concentration differs from metric anxiety because an employee may focus heavily on displayed indicators without experiencing strong evaluative strain. Conversely, anxiety could occur even when attention remains broad. Separating the constructs allows later empirical tests to compare cognitive, affective, and motivational pathways rather than treating them as one undifferentiated monitoring response.

Self-presentation is proposed as a further behavioral orientation linking consequential metrics to action. Process-monitoring evidence shows that the effect of monitoring on beyond-the-job process improvement depends on whether an error-avoidance policy is present, illustrating that workers interpret monitoring within surrounding norms of acceptable behavior [15]. Under strongly evaluative conditions, employees may therefore devote effort not only to underlying task quality but also to making performance legible, defensible, or favorable to the measurement system. Such adaptation need not be deceptive; it can include prioritizing documented accomplishments, reducing risky experimentation, or choosing tasks likely to register positively.

Table 1 organizes the evidence, constructs, relationships, uncertainties, and boundary conditions required for definitions, constructs, and conceptual boundaries for how performance dashboards narrow attention and organizational behavior.

Table 1. Definitions, constructs, and conceptual boundaries for How Performance Dashboards Narrow Attention and Organizational Behavior.

Construct or component	Definition	Problem addressed	Distinction from adjacent concepts	Proposed role	Uncertainty	Boundary statement
Dashboard as behavioral environment	Measurement setting making selected performance information visible and actionable	Neutral-interface assumptions	More than reporting technology	Proposed umbrella framing	Effects vary by design	Visibility does not itself prove behavioral change
Visible comparative metrics	Displayed indicators permitting relative-position judgments	How metrics become social cues	Visibility is not comparison	Comparison affordance	Targets may be ignored or contested	Relative information does not determine response
Metric anxiety	Proposed anticipatory strain around consequential metrics	Affective response to evaluative visibility	Distinct from general job anxiety	Proposed affective mechanism	Construct requires validation	Not assumed universal
Self-presentation orientation	Proposed effort to make performance legible or favorable to evaluators	Behavioral adaptation to visibility	Not equivalent to deception or gaming	Proposed adaptive pathway	May be functional or dysfunctional	Requires evidence of evaluative motive
Metric salience concentration	Proposed disproportionate attention to visible measures	Cognitive prioritization	Distinct from anxiety and effort	Proposed attentional mechanism	Organizational transfer uncertain	Salience is not performance

Performance narrowing	Proposed concentration of effort on measured dimensions relative to less visible work	Behavioral allocation	Broader than gaming	Proposed downstream pattern	Direction and persistence unknown	May be absent under broad or enabling systems
Enabling measurement conditions	Credible, broad, problem-solving-oriented use of measures	Deterministic harm claims	Not equivalent to low accountability	Proposed moderating family	Context dependent	Enabling design is not a guaranteed safeguard

Performance narrowing

Performance narrowing is the proposed downstream pattern that connects selective metric salience to organizationally relevant behavior. It is defined as a disproportionate concentration of attention and effort on visible, measured, or consequential dimensions relative to less visible, delayed, difficult-to-measure, or non-incentivized work. This definition does not imply that the measured dimensions are trivial or that concentration is necessarily dysfunctional. In some jobs, focusing on a small set of indicators may improve coordination and execution. The theoretical concern arises when the metric representation becomes narrower than the underlying task system and employees adapt rationally to what is most observable or consequential.

Research on gaming performance measurement demonstrates one extreme form of such adaptation: organizational actors may learn how to satisfy measurement demands in ways that weaken the connection between displayed performance and underlying quality [16]. Gaming is therefore evidence that measurement can become an object of strategic behavior, but it should not be treated as synonymous with performance narrowing. Narrowing can occur without manipulation, for example when employees choose safer tasks, allocate more time to counted activities, or defer valuable work whose outcomes are delayed. The proposed construct is intentionally broader because it seeks to capture attentional and effort displacement before behavior reaches the threshold of overt gaming.

Experimental evidence that relative performance information can alter exploration–exploitation decisions provides a second mechanism [17]. When comparative performance becomes salient, employees may favor actions that protect current standing or produce more predictable visible returns, although the direction depends on task conditions and how feedback is interpreted. Strategic-attention research likewise shows that the distribution of executive attention has performance implications, supporting the broader premise that where organizational actors concentrate attention matters [18]. Neither literature establishes that dashboards cause narrowing, but together they justify treating attention allocation as an intervening organizational process rather than assuming that measurement affects outcomes directly.

Consequential evaluation cycles supply a further boundary condition. Evidence from research evaluation shows that periodic performance assessment can generate short-horizon behavioral responses [19]. Such findings are consistent with the possibility that dashboards become more behaviorally powerful when indicators are linked to deadlines, rankings, rewards, sanctions, or reputational judgments. Yet institutional context, task characteristics, pre-existing incentives, and metric quality remain viable rival explanations. The proposed model therefore treats performance narrowing as probabilistic and reversible. It may be strongest when metric scope is narrow, consequences are salient, alternatives are difficult to observe, and workers have limited voice in interpretation; it may weaken when measurement is broad, developmental, contestable, and embedded in trusted problem-solving relationships.

Proposed dashboard-driven behavior model

The proposed Dashboard-Driven Behavior Model integrates the preceding domains into a conditional account of how dashboard configuration may reorganize attention and behavior. Its starting premise is that dashboard effects depend on what is made visible, how faithfully metrics represent underlying work, and how strongly displayed indicators are connected to evaluation. Survey evidence from healthcare organizations indicates that metric quality is consequential for relationships between performance management and interpersonal trust [20]. Accordingly, the model treats metric quality, visibility, comparability, update frequency, breadth, monitoring intensity, and consequence coupling as distinct configuration features rather than as one undifferentiated technological exposure. **Figure 1** presents the original conceptual synthesis for dashboard-driven behavior model, showing how the article’s principal constructs, mechanisms, uncertainties, and decision boundaries are connected.




Figure 1. Dashboard-Driven Behavior Model

The first model layer is dashboard configuration; the second is interpretation. Visible indicators may become comparison cues, signals of managerial control, or sources of learning depending on their meaning and context. The third layer contains the proposed internal mechanisms of metric anxiety, self-presentation orientation, and metric salience concentration. These processes are analytically separable: an employee may attend narrowly without anxiety, experience anxiety without strategically presenting performance, or present work selectively because the measurement architecture rewards legibility. Their proposed combination is therefore not assumed. Instead, the model predicts multiple pathways toward behavioral allocation, including effort concentration, exploration–exploitation shifts, gaming, helping, collaboration, and protection of visible standing.

Importantly, performance measurement can also widen rather than narrow organizational cognition. Evidence suggests that broader performance-measurement information can support cognitive conflict relevant to organizational ambidexterity [21], while the scope and integration of performance measurement interact contingently with top-management cognitive conflict in relation to innovation ambidexterity [22]. Employee-level evidence likewise associates different management-control designs with different forms of autonomous motivation [23], and enabling performance measurement is consistent with need satisfaction and autonomous motivation among managers [24]. Broad, deliberative, or interactive performance systems can therefore support cognitive engagement or autonomous motivation, indicating that behavioral narrowing should be theorized as conditional rather than inherent [21–23].

The model also proposes a recursive salience loop. Once a metric becomes a prominent basis for evaluation, employees may devote more attention to it, making subsequent dashboard changes on that metric more noticeable and socially discussable. Repeated attention could then strengthen the metric’s practical importance even when formal weighting remains unchanged. This loop is an original proposition rather than an evidence-established mechanism. Its plausibility should be tested against simpler explanations, including habit, goal clarity, incentive learning, or managerial emphasis. The recursive pathway also creates a temporal prediction: narrowing should be examined as an evolving process rather than inferred from a single exposure or cross-sectional association, because salience, trust, and behavioral adaptation may change as employees learn how the dashboard is interpreted and used.

The final model layer concerns organizationally relevant consequences, but no direct causal arrow from a dashboard to organizational performance is proposed. Measured output may improve while unmeasured work deteriorates; both may improve; neither may change; or effects may vary across employees and time. The same dashboard may also produce different interpersonal consequences across teams because trust, identification, task interdependence, and managerial interpretation differ. The complete sequence from configuration through interpretation, proposed internal mechanisms, behavioral

allocation, and organizational consequences is an original synthesis requiring empirical testing. Individual reactions cannot be aggregated automatically into team or organizational outcomes, and visible performance should never be treated as equivalent to underlying performance.

Theoretical propositions

The model yields propositions about conditions under which dashboard visibility may become behaviorally consequential. First, visibility itself should be treated as organizationally governed rather than technologically fixed. Experimental evidence shows that managers may strategically decide whether to provide relative performance information, making comparative exposure partly endogenous to managerial incentives and judgments [25]. Proposition 1 therefore states that greater comparative visibility is proposed to increase comparison activation when displayed referents are meaningful and consequential, while weak or irrelevant referents should attenuate the relationship. Proposition 2 states that consequence coupling is proposed to increase metric salience because employees have stronger reasons to monitor indicators that affect evaluation, reputation, rewards, or continued standing.

Feedback architecture provides a second set of contingencies. Experimental evidence indicates that assigned versus chosen relative performance information can interact with feedback frequency in shaping performance responses [26]. Proposition 3 therefore states that employee choice over comparative feedback is proposed to moderate the relationship between visibility and metric anxiety, with greater interpretive agency potentially weakening evaluative strain. Proposition 4 states that high update frequency is proposed to increase metric salience concentration primarily when employees perceive the metric as consequential; frequent but low-stakes information may instead support learning. These propositions deliberately separate information availability from psychological meaning.

Social consequences constitute a third pathway. Workplace evidence links envy to helping and undermining dynamics and shows that prosocial motivation can condition these relationships [27]. Multilevel evidence further indicates that collective team identification can shape envy-related interpersonal dynamics [28]. Proposition 5 therefore states that comparative dashboards are proposed to influence collaboration indirectly through relative-standing interpretations and social emotions rather than through individual task motivation alone. Proposition 6 states that strong prosocial motives or collective identification may redirect competitive comparison toward helping, whereas weak relational identification may leave more room for defensive or undermining responses. These are conditional hypotheses; the cited studies do not establish that dashboard metrics themselves cause envy.

The propositions are intentionally falsifiable. Evidence that highly visible, consequential, narrow dashboards do not concentrate attention would challenge Propositions 2, 4, and 7; evidence that broad enabling systems still produce narrowing would weaken Proposition 8. Tests should also preserve levels of analysis. Employee anxiety or self-presentation cannot establish team-level collaboration effects, and team-level comparison cannot establish organization-wide performance consequences. Strong designs should therefore measure proposed mediators directly, observe behavior over time, and include unmeasured or delayed work as outcomes rather than evaluating the model solely through dashboard indicators. Competing explanations should be specified before analysis so that evidence can discriminate among comparison, informational learning, incentive, relational, and attentional mechanisms.

Finally, Proposition 7 states that metric anxiety and metric salience concentration are proposed to increase the probability of performance narrowing when metric scope is narrow and unmeasured work is difficult to observe. Proposition 8 states that broader, higher-quality, developmental, and enabling measurement arrangements are proposed to attenuate or redirect this pathway. **Table 2** organizes the evidence, constructs, relationships, uncertainties, and boundary conditions required for proposed mechanisms, relationships, and organizational consequences in how performance dashboards narrow attention and organizational behavior.

Table 2. Proposed mechanisms, relationships, and organizational consequences in How Performance Dashboards Narrow Attention and Organizational Behavior.

Mechanism or relationship	Antecedent	Mediator or process	Moderator	Expected consequence	Supporting evidence	Rival explanation	Validation requirement
Visibility → comparison activation	Comparative indicators	Relative-standing interpretation	Referent relevance	Greater comparison salience, proposed	RPI interpretation	Goal clarity	Manipulate visibility independently
Monitoring → evaluative response	Consequential observation	Relational interpretation	Trust	Metric anxiety, proposed	LMX erosion	Poor prior leadership	Longitudinal mediation test
Salience → allocation shift	Repeated visible metrics	Metric salience concentration, proposed	Metric breadth	Narrower effort allocation, proposed	Exploration–exploitation evidence	Task difficulty	Track measured and unmeasured work

Measurement → gaming	Consequential targets	Strategic adaptation	Contestability	Signal management or gaming	Gaming evidence	Resource scarcity	Compare incentive structures
Comparison → social spillover	Relative standing	Social emotion	Prosocial motivation	Helping or undermining may change	Envy evidence	Existing rivalry	Multilevel field test
Enabling design → attenuation	Broad credible measures	Learning and interpretive agency	Task context	Narrowing may weaken, proposed	Enabling PMS evidence	Selection effects	Randomized or staggered design

Organizational design safeguards

If dashboards are behavioral environments, safeguards should address how measurement is experienced as well as what it reports. Monitoring acceptance research shows that increasingly invasive digital monitoring can reduce employee acceptance and that monitoring purpose and associated conditions influence evaluation [29]. A first proposed safeguard is therefore proportionality: collect and display only information needed for legitimate performance purposes, distinguish developmental feedback from surveillance, and make the purpose of visibility intelligible. This principle is not a validated intervention. It follows from evidence that monitoring characteristics matter and should be tested against alternatives such as employees' prior privacy preferences, job demands, and organizational norms.

A second safeguard concerns relational interpretation. Electronic performance monitoring may be experienced as privacy invasion or threat, with leader-member relations relevant to employee responses [30]. Human managers also remain theoretically important within algorithmic performance-management systems because they may translate, contextualize, or augment system outputs in ways that influence employee trust [31]. Dashboard governance should therefore preserve opportunities to explain anomalous metrics, contest misleading interpretations, and incorporate contextual knowledge that the display cannot represent. Such voice should not be confused with substantive influence: an employee may be allowed to comment while having no meaningful ability to alter an incorrect interpretation or decision.

Third, safeguards should preserve measurement breadth without assuming that more metrics are automatically superior. Evidence concerning enabling control and control extensiveness indicates that relationships with employee performance depend on surrounding circumstances [32]. The design question is thus whether metrics provide sufficient breadth to represent important work while remaining comprehensible and useful. Possible mechanisms include rotating secondary indicators, reviewing omitted work, separating exploratory activity from short-term output targets, and using qualitative interpretation alongside quantitative displays. These are proposed design principles, not demonstrated prescriptions, and their value may differ in routine, creative, interdependent, or safety-critical work.

A final safeguard concerns reviewability over time. Because measures that initially appear informative may become targets for adaptation, organizations should periodically examine whether a dashboard continues to represent the work it was intended to summarize. Such review should include omitted activities, unintended comparison effects, changes in task strategy, and discrepancies between displayed indicators and informed qualitative judgments. The principle is diagnostic rather than prescriptive: removing a metric, adding a metric, or reducing visibility could each be appropriate in different settings. What matters theoretically is maintaining the possibility that the measurement system itself—not only employee behavior—may require revision when evidence suggests that the representation has become behaviorally distorting.

Taken together, monitoring acceptability, relational interpretation, and human managerial mediation indicate that dashboard governance is partly social rather than exclusively technical [29–31]. A defensible safeguard architecture should therefore evaluate metric quality, breadth, consequence coupling, feedback choice, developmental framing, privacy implications, and opportunities for contextual challenge. It should also monitor unintended displacement: apparent improvement on visible indicators is insufficient evidence of organizational benefit if unmeasured service, learning, cooperation, or long-horizon work deteriorates. Safeguards should consequently be judged by whether they preserve legitimate accountability while allowing evidence to show that narrowing is absent, beneficial, harmful, or context dependent.

Conclusion

This Original Propositional Model Article reframes performance dashboards as behavioral environments whose significance extends beyond information display. Its principal contribution, the proposed Dashboard-Driven Behavior Model, connects dashboard configuration with social comparison, perceived evaluation, proposed metric anxiety, proposed metric salience concentration, self-presentational adaptation, and performance narrowing. The model does not presume that these processes occur together or that their downstream consequences are negative. Instead, it explains why visibility, comparability, monitoring, metric breadth, metric quality, feedback architecture, and consequence coupling should be treated as distinct design conditions capable of producing different behavioral pathways.

Performance narrowing is therefore best understood as a testable possibility rather than an intrinsic dashboard effect. Visible measures may improve attention, learning, coordination, and accountability when they represent work credibly and support problem solving; they may also displace attention toward what is easiest to measure when evaluative consequences are strong and important activities remain peripheral. The proposed constructs and relationships require direct construct validation, longitudinal observation, experimental manipulation, multilevel testing, and comparison with rival explanations.

The broader implication is that dashboard quality cannot be inferred solely from informational accuracy or measured performance improvement. Evaluation must also ask what becomes salient, what becomes comparatively meaningful, what remains unseen, and how employees can interpret or challenge performance signals. The model offers a bounded theoretical architecture for asking those questions while leaving its propositions open to refinement, falsification, or rejection.

This framing also preserves an important decision boundary: organizational legitimacy cannot be inferred from technical visibility. A metric may be accurate yet incomplete, useful yet intrusive, or predictive yet unsuitable as the sole basis for consequential judgment. Those distinctions should remain explicit whenever dashboards are evaluated or redesigned.

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