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Employee Resistance Under Digitally Managed Organizational Control Systems

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Abstract

Digitally managed organizational control systems increasingly shape how work is observed, evaluated, allocated, rewarded, and corrected. Yet the organizational problem is not simply that digital technologies intensify control; it is that they redistribute visibility, discretion, and interpretive authority in ways that may provoke heterogeneous employee responses. This Critical Review Article examines how measurement and surveillance practices become behavioral discipline, how workers interpret those arrangements, and how resistance develops at individual and collective levels. The review uses a transparent critical-review approach with PRISMA-compatible reporting to evaluate conceptual assumptions, evidence designs, measurement choices, mechanisms, contradictions, contextual boundaries, and unresolved questions across organizational behavior, human resource management, organization studies, and technology-mediated work. The evidence indicates that digital control is multidimensional: behavioral visibility, electronic monitoring, algorithmic scheduling, performance rating, reward allocation, and informal attitudinal monitoring are related but analytically distinct. Existing studies also challenge deterministic accounts because algorithmic control can coexist with autonomy, opaque evaluation can trigger reactivity, and power asymmetries do not eliminate worker agency. The article therefore treats resistance neither as simple noncompliance nor as inherently emancipatory. Its original contribution is a control–resistance synthesis in which control architecture is translated through behavioral discipline and worker interpretation before producing varied resistance repertoires and relational or performance consequences. The framework remains provisional. Evidence is uneven across occupations, technologies, countries, levels of analysis, and time horizons, and the proposed cross-domain relationships require longitudinal, multilevel, comparative, and intervention-sensitive testing.

Keywords: Measurement and surveillance practices, Behavioral discipline, Individual resistance repertoires, Collective resistance repertoires, Governance and research agenda, Resistance

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Introduction

Digitally managed organizational control has become a central means through which organizations assign work, observe conduct, evaluate performance, structure incentives, and coordinate dispersed labor. The emerging literature does not depict this development as a frictionless substitution of software for supervision. Instead, algorithmic management combines technical capacities with organizational rules that direct, evaluate, discipline, and reward workers, creating a contested terrain in which control and resistance are recursively related rather than separable phenomena [1]. This perspective matters because the same digital infrastructure can simultaneously make worker behavior more legible to management and make the practical basis of evaluation less legible to workers.



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Behavioral visibility captures one part of this shift. Datafication can render actions, interactions, and work traces newly observable, thereby changing what organizational actors can see and potentially act upon [2]. Visibility, however, is not equivalent to accurate knowledge of contribution, effort, or performance. Electronic performance monitoring similarly encompasses technology-enabled observation, recording, and analysis of work-related behavior and performance information, but monitoring arrangements differ in purpose, invasiveness, timing, transparency, and consequence [3]. Treating these practices as one undifferentiated form of surveillance therefore obscures important variation in how control is enacted and experienced.

The analytical problem becomes sharper when digital systems participate directly in work design. Algorithmic management can shape job demands, resources, autonomy, feedback, and allocation structures rather than merely record pre-existing work [4]. Platform research likewise shows that digitally mediated governance can combine market coordination with organizational control while shifting risk and responsibility toward workers [5]. Yet evidence from platform labor cannot be assumed to describe conventional employment, and employee perceptions cannot be translated automatically into organization-level outcomes.

This article addresses that gap through a Critical Review Article that evaluates how measurement and surveillance practices become behavioral discipline, how workers respond individually and collectively, and how those responses relate to trust and performance. The contribution is critical rather than aggregative: it identifies convergence, contradiction, methodological concentration, and missing boundary conditions, then develops an original Control–Resistance Framework without presenting it as a validated causal model or universally applicable prescription.

Critical review method

The review used an explicit critical-review design in which search, selection, appraisal, and synthesis choices were aligned with the article's conceptual questions rather than with an exhaustive-effectiveness objective. Critical reviewing requires transparent methodological choices while allowing heterogeneous theoretical, qualitative, quantitative, and integrative evidence to be examined for assumptions, mechanisms, contradictions, and omissions [6]. Searches combined algorithmic management, electronic performance monitoring, digital surveillance, behavioral visibility, worker agency, resistance, workarounds, solidarity, trust, stress, performance, legitimacy, and related terms across targeted publisher and journal sites, DOI/Crossref-indexed sources, multidisciplinary scholarly indexes, and citation chaining.

Eligibility required a peer-reviewed Q1 journal article in the relevant publication period, a verifiable DOI, direct relevance to a planned review question or synthesis category, and sufficient methodological or conceptual detail for bounded interpretation. Duplicate DOI or article records were removed before screening. The search yielded 51 records; three duplicates were removed, leaving 48 records screened. Six were excluded at title and abstract stage. Forty-two reports were sought and retrieved, and all were assessed in full. Eight were excluded for redundant or overlapping contribution ($n=5$), adjacent outcome or scope ($n=1$), incomplete final bibliographic metadata ($n=1$), or unsuitable article type ($n=1$), leaving 34 sources for synthesis.

PRISMA conventions were used to make record flow transparent [7]. Its explanation and elaboration informed stage-level reporting and exclusion accounting [8]. Appraisal focused on construct clarity, design, context, level of analysis, mechanism, limitation, and transferability; synthesis compared convergence and conflict rather than assigning fabricated quality scores or pooled effects. **Figure 1** reports the verified flow of records through identification, duplicate removal, screening, full-text assessment, exclusion, and final inclusion for this critical review article.




Figure 1. PRISMA Flow Diagram for Evidence Identification and Selection.

The figure reports the evidence-identification and selection process used for “Employee Resistance Under Digitally Managed Organizational Control Systems.” Every numerical value and exclusion reason derives from the verified review search-and-screening ledger. The diagram is a reporting device and does not change the declared review design or establish exhaustive coverage.

Measurement and surveillance practices

Measurement and surveillance are best understood as related but distinct components of digitally managed control. Observation theory shows that transparency can alter behavior because being observable changes the strategic environment in which workers perform, coordinate, and protect discretion [9]. The implication is not that visibility necessarily improves accountability. Increased observability may expose useful information, but it can also shift attention toward what is measurable, encourage impression management, or reduce spaces in which workers experiment without immediate evaluation. Algorithmic surveillance adds a spatial and representational dimension. In gig work, systems may construct a managerial “conceived” space of routes, locations, acceptance, timing, and availability that differs from workers’ lived experience of the job [10]. This distinction is important because digital records can appear precise while still representing only selected aspects of work. A critical review therefore must separate data capture from construct validity and system visibility from substantive performance.

Measurement research has begun to disaggregate algorithmic-management exposure. A validated questionnaire distinguishes monitoring, goal setting, scheduling, performance rating, and compensation as separable dimensions, demonstrating that algorithmic management is not a single exposure [11]. That contribution improves construct clarity, but a worker’s reported exposure remains different from an objective audit of system design, data flows, or decision rules. Evidence from distributed teams further shows that formal digital control may be supplemented by informal attitude monitoring when managers lack direct physical access to employees [12]. Thus surveillance can be enacted through both technical systems and managerial interpretation.

These findings converge on a core point: measurement practices become organizationally consequential through how they are interpreted and tied to decisions, not through data capture alone. Differences in occupation and work arrangement offer an alternative explanation for some apparent disagreements: a platform rating, an electronic monitor, and a manager’s remote attitude check do not create identical information or consequences. **Table 1** organizes the evidence, constructs, relationships, uncertainties, and boundary conditions required for review design, evidence domains, and extraction framework for employee resistance under digitally managed organizational control systems.

Table 1. Review design, evidence domains, and extraction framework for Employee Resistance Under Digitally Managed Organizational Control Systems.

Evidence Domain or Review Construct	Review Question	Extraction Fields	Appraisal or Relevance Criterion	Synthesis Role	Main Limitation	Interpretation Boundary
Behavioral Visibility	What becomes observable?	Trace; observer; visibility	Identifies visibility mechanism	Evidence domain	Broad scope	Visibility ≠ performance
Observation and Transparency	How can observation alter conduct?	Observability; discretion; response	Direct behavioral relevance	Critical comparator	Not algorithm-specific	Response ≠ performance effect
Electronic Performance Monitoring	How is work monitored?	Purpose; timing; invasiveness; transparency	Separates monitoring forms	Control category	Heterogeneous implementation	EPM is not one treatment
Algorithmic Work Design	How does digital control reshape jobs?	Demands; resources; autonomy; feedback	Mechanism relevance	Discipline bridge	Propositional evidence	Conceptual pathway ≠ causal proof
Algorithmic-Management Exposure	Which control functions are perceived?	Monitoring; goals; scheduling; ratings; compensation	Validated dimensionality	Measurement scaffold	Perceptual measure	Exposure ≠ system audit
Remote Informal Control	What supplements formal digital monitoring?	Attitude monitoring; managerial interpretation	Direct distributed-work evidence	Extends surveillance construct	Context-specific	Remote work ≠ surveillance

Resistance and Consequences	Which responses and outcomes enter synthesis?	Response; level; outcome; boundary	Direct article relevance	Proposed review extraction category	Cross-study heterogeneity	No cross-level or causal inference without evidence
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Note. “Synthesis role” and the final extraction category are original review classifications. Evidence-derived statements retain the cited source boundary; no row ranks evidence strength, invents quantities, or implies a universal causal sequence

Behavioral discipline

Behavioral discipline refers here to organizational attempts to translate digital measurement into patterned conduct through allocation, evaluation, incentives, reputational consequences, scheduling, or informational asymmetry. Platform research demonstrates that matching systems can become control systems when access to tasks, evaluation, compensation, and continued participation are coordinated through algorithmic rules rather than through matching alone [13]. The disciplinary effect therefore lies not simply in automation but in the coupling of measurement to consequential decisions.

Opacity further complicates that process. Longitudinal qualitative evidence shows that workers facing opaque algorithmic evaluations may react strategically to uncertainty about how their performance is judged [14]. Such reactivity cautions against models in which employees are treated as passive targets of control. When evaluation rules cannot be fully inspected, workers may infer them from outcomes, modify conduct experimentally, or redirect effort toward signals they believe the system rewards. The evidence supports adaptive response, but it does not establish that opacity produces the same reaction across technologies or occupations.

A second contradiction concerns autonomy. Cross-national gig-work evidence indicates that algorithmic control can coexist with perceived flexibility and autonomy while also producing constraints, intensification, and burdens [15]. Autonomy and control are therefore not simple opposites: discretion over when or where to work may coexist with strong dependence on ratings, task allocation, or platform rules. Likewise, power asymmetry does not eliminate worker agency. Research on online sellers shows that actors operating under platform power can still interpret, accommodate, and maneuver within algorithmically structured environments [16].

Taken together, the evidence suggests that behavioral discipline is better conceptualized as an attempted conversion of visibility into conduct than as successful behavioral determination. Its effectiveness depends on what is measured, how consequential decisions are attached to measurements, what workers understand about the system, and what alternative resources or strategies remain available. This distinction creates the analytical bridge to the resistance repertoires examined next.

Individual resistance repertoires

Individual resistance is treated here as worker action that modifies, circumvents, contests, or strategically accommodates digitally managed control without requiring coordinated collective action. In on-demand work, workers have used arbitrage strategies to exploit informational and operational gaps between formal platform rules and situated work conditions [17]. Such practices show why resistance cannot be reduced to open refusal: employees may continue participating while selectively manipulating timing, location, information, or system-facing behavior.

Spatial control provides a second repertoire. Food-delivery research shows that workers can reinterpret and practically undermine digitally mediated spatial constraints rather than simply submit to geolocation-based organization [18]. Other evidence identifies “hidden” forms of agency in which resistance remains beneath formal organizational visibility [19]. These findings converge on the existence of practical and interpretive maneuvering, but they do not establish its prevalence or organizational effectiveness across employment systems.

Resistance also carries costs. Mixed-method evidence from hospitality indicates that perceived algorithmic restraints can motivate resistance while resistance itself may be associated with poorer worker wellbeing [20]. Accordingly, resistance should not be romanticized as empowerment. It may protect discretion, create new burdens, or merely redistribute the costs of control.

Conceptually, these repertoires are better classified by what workers do to the control relation than by whether management observes opposition. Arbitrage exploits system gaps; spatial reinterpretation alters how instructions are enacted; hidden resistance withholds contestation from managerial view; and withdrawal reduces exposure to the control arrangement. The categories can overlap in practice, and the available evidence does not justify ranking them by effectiveness. This classification is therefore an original synthesis intended to prevent visible protest from becoming the implicit benchmark against which all individual resistance is recognized.

Collective resistance repertoires

Individual maneuvering becomes collective resistance only when workers develop shared interpretations, relational ties, organizational resources, or coordinated claims. Comparative courier research shows that solidarity under platform work is

enabled and constrained by labor-process and social conditions rather than generated automatically by common exposure to algorithmic control [21]. Thus similar technologies can coexist with different capacities for collective action.

Platform architecture is itself one contextual condition. Evidence from China indicates that technical, legal, and organizational features of platform systems can help shape variation in collective contention [22]. Yet architecture should not be treated as a sufficient cause: worker identities, institutional arrangements, employment relations, and opportunities for coordination remain plausible alternative explanations. Research on platform mobilisations similarly demonstrates variation in the forms and origins of collective resistance [23].

Digital connectivity also has an ambivalent role. Remote freelancers can use online communities for support and organization, while nationality, occupation, and platform boundaries continue to fragment collective capacity [24]. Collective resistance therefore ranges from solidarity and mutual support to mobilization, protest, and organized conflict, but connectivity alone does not establish bargaining power. The evidence remains concentrated in platform settings, making direct transfer to conventional hierarchies uncertain.

This distinction also separates collective voice opportunity from consequential influence. A communication channel, worker forum, or online community may permit grievances to circulate without altering allocation rules, evaluation criteria, or managerial authority. Conversely, collective power may arise from resources outside the digital system, including occupational dependence, institutional protections, and organizational coordination. The reviewed studies therefore support attention to how workers become connected and mobilized, but they do not establish that digitally mediated connectivity itself redistributes formal decision rights or produces durable changes in organizational control.

Consequences for trust and performance

The consequences of digitally managed control should be evaluated separately from its visibility and disciplinary capacity. Meta-analytic evidence on electronic performance monitoring found no overall performance advantage across the synthesized samples while showing an association between monitoring and stress [25]. This result does not establish that monitoring can never improve performance under particular conditions; it establishes a stronger boundary: monitored activity, compliance, or increased observability cannot be treated as demonstrated performance gains without direct performance evidence.

Trust is similarly conditional. Experimental evidence indicates that perceptions of algorithmic fairness, trust, and emotion vary with the type of managerial decision delegated to an algorithm [26]. Consequently, resistance attributed to “algorithm aversion” may partly reflect judgments about task appropriateness, procedural legitimacy, or the meaning of a decision rather than opposition to automation itself. Short-term experimental judgments, however, cannot establish durable workplace trust trajectories.

Other consequences may operate through how algorithmic control positions workers. App-based gig-work evidence identifies objectification as a plausible pathway connecting algorithmic control with less proactive customer-service behavior [27]. The design and context limit generalization, but the mechanism highlights a critical distinction: systems may secure measurable conformity while undermining relational or discretionary behavior not fully captured by their metrics. Trust and performance therefore remain outcomes to be demonstrated, not inferred from the apparent strength of control.

Alternative explanations remain substantial. Monitoring may be introduced in jobs already characterized by low trust, unstable performance, difficult measurement, or strong managerial concern, making observed employee reactions partly a consequence of pre-existing conditions. Employees may also respond differently to identical technical capabilities because implementation transparency, stakes, managerial communication, and occupational norms vary. The literature therefore permits claims about associations and plausible mechanisms more readily than broad claims that digital control itself causes either superior performance or deteriorating trust across organizations.

Proposed control–resistance framework

Figure 2 presents the original conceptual synthesis for control–resistance framework, showing how the article’s principal constructs, mechanisms, uncertainties, and decision boundaries are connected.




Figure 2. Control-Resistance Framework

The framework addresses fragmentation in algorithmic-management research by separating control architecture from the mechanisms and interpretations through which it becomes consequential [28]. Perceived legitimacy is positioned in the interpretive hinge because workers' acceptance or contestation of algorithmic control can depend on whether the system is regarded as legitimate [29]. Human managers remain relevant because algorithmic performance management does not remove managerial trust relations; managerial reflexivity is proposed as one process through which those relations may be shaped [30]. Perceived affordances of algorithmic scores further explain why workers can respond differently to similar evaluative devices and why responses may change over time [31].

The synthesis therefore rejects a direct technology-to-compliance pathway. Measurement creates possibilities for control; behavioral discipline attaches consequences to those measurements; interpretation shapes the repertoire of response. The integrated sequencing and feedback loop are proposed rather than empirically validated.

The feedback path is especially important but evidentially weaker than the component mechanisms. Worker adaptation may reveal blind spots, provoke tighter rules, produce new metrics, or encourage managerial accommodation; subsequent control changes may then alter the next repertoire of resistance. This recursive logic is consistent with evidence of adaptation and contestation but has not been tested as a complete temporal sequence. The framework also crosses levels: individual interpretation can contribute to collective coordination, yet an employee-level response cannot be treated as evidence of organization-level change without multilevel data. These distinctions define the framework's principal validation requirements.

The framework also leaves open competing accounts of observed resistance. Apparent opposition may arise from poor system usability, inaccurate measurement, distributive conflict, occupational norms, workload pressure, or pre-existing distrust rather than from digital control as such. Conversely, low visible resistance may reflect dependence, constrained alternatives, or concealed adaptation rather than genuine legitimacy. Testing the framework therefore requires designs that observe control configuration, worker interpretation, response, and subsequent organizational change separately. The model is intended to organize those distinctions, not to decide in advance whether resistance signals system failure, employee irrationality, or effective protection of discretion.

Governance and research agenda

Governance should treat algorithmic management as an employment-relations and HRM problem rather than as a software implementation problem. Existing scholarship identifies unresolved questions around work allocation, performance management, and the employment relationship itself [32]. Governance therefore requires clarity about who sets decision rules, what workers can contest, how human managers intervene, and which consequences attach to digital measurements.

A further priority is avoiding technological determinism. Algorithmic management can simultaneously constrain and enable autonomy or value creation, depending on how inputs, processes, outputs, and work arrangements are configured [33]. This duality makes simple prescriptions for either more automation or more human discretion analytically weak. Research should instead compare configurations and identify which mechanisms operate under specified conditions.

Collective institutions also deserve greater attention. Evidence from a unionized manufacturing setting shows that workplace regime, union power, and shopfloor conflict can shape the politics of algorithmic management beyond platform work [34]. Future studies should therefore combine longitudinal designs, validated multidimensional measurement, worker–manager matched data, organizational trace evidence, and cross-national or union/non-union comparison. Such designs could test whether legitimacy, managerial mediation, and collective power moderate the movement from digital control architecture to resistance rather than merely documenting their coexistence.

Governance research should additionally distinguish technological capability from legitimate authority. A system may technically rank, schedule, recommend, or restrict action without settling who ought to authorize those consequences, what reasons workers are owed, or which decisions remain contestable. Empirical research can evaluate these questions by comparing implementation episodes before and after rule changes, tracing worker and manager interpretations over time, and separating formal policy from enacted practice. The relevant outcome is not whether organizations adopt a single “best” model, but which configurations preserve accountable decision rights while avoiding unsupported assumptions that more data, more automation, or more visible compliance necessarily constitute better governance.

Conclusion

Digitally managed control is not adequately explained as either technological domination or neutral coordination. The reviewed literature instead shows a layered organizational process in which measurement and visibility create control possibilities, disciplinary arrangements connect those measurements to consequential decisions, and workers interpret and respond to those arrangements through heterogeneous individual and collective repertoires. Resistance can protect discretion, remain concealed, become organized, or impose costs on workers themselves.

The proposed Control–Resistance Framework contributes an integrative language for connecting these domains while preserving their evidential boundaries. It distinguishes visibility from performance, control attempts from behavioral determination, individual experience from organizational outcomes, and conceptual plausibility from validation. Its recursive and cross-domain pathways remain propositions for research rather than established causal sequences. Greater confidence will require longitudinal, multilevel, comparative, and context-sensitive designs spanning platform and conventional workplaces. The central implication is therefore analytical rather than prescriptive: understanding digitally managed control requires explaining not only what systems measure and decide, but how organizational actors interpret, contest, reproduce, and potentially reconfigure those systems.

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